“Value for money” is used every day in Irish public debate, but it is not a shared language. The public use it to ask whether public services and projects were worth what was paid. Public bodies use it to assess whether spending complied with established procedures and appraisal rules (i.e. did we follow the rules?). When those two meanings diverge, people rightly feel their concerns aren’t being answered.
The result is that debates about public spending often collapse into process talk or politics, leaving a basic question unanswered:
Did the State deliver what it said it would deliver, at the cost it said it would cost?
This piece sets out a minimum, operational way to answer that question.
Since being elected to the Dáil, I have been working to build a database of public payments and purchase orders covering more than €99.5 billion in public spending across multiple departments and agencies. That work has convinced me that the absence of a shared language is the central reason why debates about public spending so often generate frustration rather than clarity. People are left without a clear way to judge whether public money is actually delivering a good deal.
- €99.5bn
- Public spending in the database
- 500,000+
- Payment and purchase order records
- €147bn
- Projected State spending by 2030
My engagement with this issue began with a simple question my team and I asked about two years ago: “Value for money, what does that actually mean?”
Most people’s frame of reference is their own household finances. That’s natural. But household budgeting and State budgeting operate on fundamentally different principles.
The State operates at a scale, through systems, and under legal and distributional obligations that make outcomes harder for the public to observe directly. Decisions are made collectively, delivered through administrative processes, and paid for over long time horizons. As a result, whether public money was well spent is not always legible in the way household spending is. This increases the State’s obligation to account clearly for what it committed to, what it delivered, and what it paid.
The Department of Public Expenditure defines value for money as a formal requirement:
“All Irish Public Bodies are obliged to treat public funds with care and to ensure that the best possible value-for-money is obtained whenever public money is being spent or invested”1Department of Public Expenditure
That requirement is given practical effect through the Public Spending Code, which sets out how public bodies are expected to appraise, approve, manage, and review expenditure. But it cannot resolve political disagreements about what should be prioritised or what outcomes should matter.
What can be evaluated independently of those disagreements is how effectively the system executes once a decision has been taken. Whether one agrees with a policy or not, there is a legitimate public interest in knowing whether the State did what it said it would do, using the resources it said it would use.2
At present, these two questions:
- Was this the right policy?
- Was this policy competently executed?
are often conflated. When that happens, debates about public spending collapse into arguments about intent rather than evidence. This means that neither policy choices nor operational performance receives proper scrutiny. A project that fails operationally might be defended on the grounds that the policy was sound; a policy that is sound might be obscured by operational failure.
What remains unclear is how the public can independently assess whether that standard was met. Cost–benefit analysis at State level can be complex. Public Spending Code guidance, appraisal manuals, and value-for-money frameworks account for things most people never encounter in day-to-day life: non-market benefits, distributional effects, long-term risk, statutory duties, and opportunity costs across entire systems.
That necessary complexity creates a gap between how the system explains spending decisions and how the public experiences them. When people raise concerns about public spending, they are often met with technical descriptions of process or compliance that do not answer the underlying question of delivery. All done in a language they don’t recognise. This doesn’t meet people where they are and over time, this erodes trust.
What people can understand are concrete examples. The “bike shed” controversy and the National Children’s Hospital are obvious examples.
As Ken Foxe, the journalist who broke the bike shed story and has done extensive work on State transparency, put it:
“How does a lay person – or indeed a journalist – tell the difference between two major projects, both costing the same amount of money? Which one of them was too expensive? And which one was executed to near perfection and achieved maximum value for money for the taxpayer?”Ken Foxe
That question cannot be answered without a clear link between contracts, costs, and delivery.3
The bike shed was legible. €336,000 maps onto everyday reference points: the cost of a house, a number of Special Needs Assistants, or several nursing posts. €100 million does not map onto everyday reference points. At that scale, costs become abstract, and abstraction makes accountability harder. But the real issue is not legibility; it is that we lack a shared, operational language for evaluating whether the State got what it paid for.
In practical terms, this means asking a simpler, operational question:
Did the State do what it said it would do, in the way it said it would do it, using the resources it said it would use?
That question led me to develop a simple operational test.
01Creating a shared framing
Public spending almost always contains an irreducible subjective element4. However, once a decision has been taken and public money is committed, a different standard applies. At that point, the question is no longer whether everyone agrees with the policy, but whether the system executed that decision competently.
I wanted to step away from abstract debates about “value” and focus on a practical question: what is the point where the system and the public can actually meet to talk constructively about public spending?
The answer I landed on was deliberately simple, because shared understanding requires a shared starting point, not shared expertise. So I developed a simple framework to operationalise this distinction.
The framework
The Contract Delivery Test
Did we get what we contracted to get, as defined in the contract and any formally approved changes?Yes / No
Was it delivered at the price agreed, including documented variations?Yes / No
What was the total amount paid by the State for this contract?Number
For any public project delivered through a contract, we should be able to answer those three basic questions. Together, they form a minimum test of execution competence. They do not attempt to determine whether a policy was the right one. They establish whether the State delivered on its own stated terms5.
This framework is deliberately limited. By asking only whether the State delivered on its stated terms, we create a shared language for talking about value for money.
A key point is this framing doesn’t try to replace existing appraisal frameworks or value-for-money guidance. It sits underneath them. If the system is functioning properly, being able to answer these questions should be straightforward.
If an organisation consistently fails to do what it planned to do, within the resources it planned to use, then it has a systemic problem.
There is little that is innovative here. Comparable practices are embedded in private-sector project management. The State should therefore be able to address such questions as a matter of routine; failure to do so constitutes a deficit of governance capacity.
02Why procurement is the right place to start
Procurement is the clearest place to start because it involves explicit commitments on scope, price, and delivery. It’s the point where public debate and administrative reality can meet on common ground.
“Procurement is when the State buys something it cannot do itself. It decides what it needs, goes to market, picks a supplier, and agrees on a price.”
When the State needs specialised goods or services, such as building a school, delivering an IT system, or carrying out specialist work, it goes to the market and makes an explicit and testable commitment: it defines a requirement, runs a competitive process, awards a contract, and agrees a price and scope of delivery. That sequence creates a contractual obligation on the supplier and an accountability obligation on the public body (contracting authority).
Not all public spending fits this model. Employment contracts, pay agreements, and income supports involve broader considerations that make simple comparison misleading. For this reason, this framework focuses on procurement with a defined contract, where expectations, costs, and responsibilities can be clearly identified. This is a minimum viable case for operational accountability: a domain where the State plans explicitly, commits resources deliberately, and can reasonably be expected to account for delivery against the plan.
In procurement, we can trace a clear sequence:
- A public body needs something it cannot do itself
- It runs a procurement
- It awards a contract
- It spends public money
The contract tells us:
- What was planned to be delivered
- By whom
- At what price (roughly)
From that, the minimum set of information we need is not controversial: supplier name, contract details (what is being delivered), contract value, and payments made against that contract.
If we can get this information, we now have the minimum viable dataset required to talk meaningfully about delivery and value. If we cannot reliably link these, then meaningful financial accountability is difficult.
03Why this framing matters for trust and performance
In procurement, two parties have clear responsibilities: a contracting authority must manage public funds effectively, and a supplier must meet contractual obligations.
When projects overrun, we tend to focus on the public body. Yet we often lack clear visibility into whether contractual obligations were met by the supplier, whether scope changed, or whether pricing assumptions were realistic.
If, for example, we repeatedly spend more than planned on IT consultancy contracts, that may indicate:
- Poor scoping
- Weak pricing capability
- Structural dependence on external expertise
Any organisation, whether public or private, plans within limited resources. If what an organisation ends up doing consistently diverges from what it planned to do, it has a resource management problem. At State scale, the consequences are significant: underspending means opportunities lost elsewhere, and overspending means knock-on effects across the system.
We should therefore be able to see, clearly:
- How much we spend on contracts
- How many come in on, under, or over budget
- Which contracts account for overruns
- Who we are spending public money with, and for what
If the public doesn’t have that visibility, that’s a democratic problem. But if the State itself doesn’t have it, that is a systemic governance failure.
04When systems don’t connect
Once you accept this framing, the next question becomes unavoidable: can the State actually trace payments back to the contracts that authorised them?
In my work to date, I’ve found that this traceability is not reliably possible because the system is not designed to connect those things6. Across the €99.5 billion in spending and 500,000+ payment and purchase order records in my database, I found no reliable way to link these records back to the original contract award notice. This means we can answer one question: how much did the State pay? But we cannot reliably answer the other two critical questions: did we get what we contracted to get? Was it delivered at the agreed price?
Tenders, contract awards, and payment systems frequently operate as parallel processes rather than as a single, connected accountability chain. Each lives in its own system; the data flows do not meet. This means the State cannot easily see patterns in its spending: which contracts consistently overrun, which suppliers consistently deliver late, which types of projects are most problematic. Without that visibility, the same mistakes repeat.
For a country where projected spending under the new EU fiscal framework is set to almost triple over fifteen years, rising from €54 billion in 2015 to €147 billion by 2030, this design problem becomes more urgent. As the scale of spending increases, the consequences of poor contract management multiply. The State needs to be able to track and learn from its spending patterns, not just authorise them.
Design problems persist until someone deliberately redesigns the system. That is what this framework is designed to do. I plan to bring a private members bill to underpin it via legislation.
05Why this matters to me
At State scale, the consequences of mismanaged spending are not evenly distributed. When spending is mismanaged, the impact falls first on those without buffers or alternatives.
Public spending cannot increase indefinitely. Economic cycles turn, and when they do, cuts follow. That is a political and fiscal reality, not an ideological one. The question is where those cuts land.
The State has a clear responsibility to protect people who depend on public services and income supports to live with dignity. This is precisely the context in which value for money matters most.
When public funds are wasted or poorly managed, it narrows the State’s capacity to protect those people. It increases the risk that, in a downturn, the wrong areas will be squeezed. As a public representative, I regard that risk as unacceptable. Ensuring that financial mismanagement never translates into harm for those without power or a voice is one of the reasons I entered public life in the first place.
The framework I’m proposing is a tool for achieving that goal. If we can ensure that public money is spent as intended, we protect the State’s capacity to invest in the services and supports that vulnerable people depend on.
My focus on public spending is to make it work better. Even a one-per-cent improvement at the scale of the State is enormous. On more than €100 billion of spending, that is over a €1 billion redirected to services and supports, and once public money is spent, we do not get to spend it again. The task is difficult, but that is precisely why it is worth doing.
06Next steps
From here, I am starting with procurement and will push until the State can follow every payment back to the contract that approved it.
I regard it as my responsibility to show the work behind this effort and explain what needs to change. I will publish updates, documents, parliamentary questions and data as I go.
This is not about removing politics from public spending. Disagreement about priorities is legitimate. What matters is preventing failures of delivery from being hidden behind arguments about intent.
If the State cannot reliably show that it delivers what it commits to deliver, within the resources it commits to use, then debates about value for money will continue to undermine public trust and weaken the State’s capacity to govern effectively. In that environment, political disagreement about priorities becomes entangled with basic questions of execution, and neither receives proper scrutiny.
But if the State can provide clear, consistent data on contract performance, a different standard becomes possible and we can have a different kind of debate: one grounded in evidence rather than assertion, where political disagreement is about what we should do, not about what we actually did.
Show the data, and politics can be about decisions rather than disputes about reality.
Notes
- Value for money is understood as using public resources to maximise public value while achieving stated policy objectives. ↩
- This is a question of state capacity: the State’s ability to follow through. It is one thing to decide what should happen; it is another to make it actually happen. Governments are elected on plans and promises, but there is a separate and reasonable question the public is entitled to ask: did the State deliver what it said it would deliver, on time and within budget? ↩
- This will be the focus of a future piece. ↩
- Political decisions about what to fund, where to invest, and which outcomes to prioritise reflect political judgement and societal values. There is no technical mechanism that can eliminate disagreement at that stage, nor should there be. ↩
- The binary framing is intentional. Questions such as “Did we get what we contracted to get?” are not about subjective satisfaction or whether outcomes met every expectation. They are about whether the thing specified in the contract, once approved changes are taken into account, was delivered. For example, the question is not whether a hospital was perfect or whether every stakeholder was satisfied, but whether the hospital that was contracted for, as defined in the contract and its authorised variations, was in fact delivered. Where expectations evolve, quality is disputed, or scope expands, those issues should be reflected in formal contract changes. The Yes/No test is applied only after that process. If the system cannot clearly account for what was ultimately contracted for and whether it was delivered, that is a failure of accountability, not an unavoidable feature of complexity. ↩
- In practice, the State cannot reliably trace payments back to the contracts that authorised them. ↩